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TITLE VII: RELATIONSHIP AND EFFECT ON THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ROBERT S. FUCHS *
DAVID B. ELLIS**
The National Labor Relations Board was created by Congress
in 1935 to administer the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act),' which was subsequently amended in 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) 2
and again in 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act). 3 The basic purpose of the
act is to promote collective bargaining and to protect freedom of
employee organization as the best means of encouraging and insuring
industrial peace. Under the act, the Board has two primary functions:
(1) To prevent and remedy unfair labor practices, whether by labor
organizations or employers, and (2) to determine by Board conducted
secret ballot elections whether employees wish to have unions repre-
sent them in collective bargaining. This article examines the past and
future roles of the NLRB in the prevention of racial discrimination.
I. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS IT AFFECTS BOARD
CONDUCTED ELECTIONS
The pronouncement of the Board in 1948 in its General Shoe
Corp. case' generally defines its basic policy in conducting elections:
Because we cannot police the details surrounding every elec-
tion, and because we believe that in the absence of excessive
acts employees can be taken to have expressed their true
convictions in'the secrecy of the polling booth, the Board has
exercised this power sparingly, . . .
. . . . In election proceedings, it is the Board's function
to provide a laboratory in which an experiment can be con-
ducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to deter-
mine the uninhibited desires of the employees. . . .5
* A.B. Rollins College, 1934; LL.B., Boston College Law School, 1938; Assistant
Regional Attorney, National Labor Relations Board; Instructor, Boston College Law
School.
** A.B., Boston University, 1954; LL.B., Boston University Law School, 1957;
LLM., New York University School of Law, 1958; Attorney, National Labor Relations
Board; Lecturer in Labor Legislation and Labor Management Relations, Northeastern
University. This article does not reflect the official position of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board or the General Counsel of the Board.
1 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
2 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
3
 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1964).
4 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
5
 Id. at 126-27.
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This rule has been refined in Radio Corp. of America,6 United
States Gypsum Co.,' and then in Hollywood Ceramics Co.,' where
the Board stated:
We believe that an election should be set aside only
where there has been a misrepresentation or other similar
campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure
from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or
parties from making an effective reply, so that the misrepre-
sentation whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be ex-
pected to have a significant impact on the election. 9
In evaluating the interference resulting from specific conduct, the
Board does not attempt to assess its actual effect on the employees but
rather concerns itself with whether it is reasonable to conclude that
the conduct tended to prevent a free expression of the employees' choice.
In making this evaluation the Board treats each case on its own facts,
taking an ad hoc rather than a per se approach in its resolution of the
issues. It was within the framework of these guidelines that the Board
first considered cases relating to racial discrimination prior to 1962.
While there have been prior cases in which the Board found inter-
ference by the use of racial appeals in conjunction with other acts,"
as pointed out by some commentators," it did not, until the Sewell
Mfg. Co. case,' treat racial appeals in a manner different from other
6 106 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1953).
7
 130 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
8 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
9 Id. at 224.
10
 See, e.g., South Texas Produce Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1442 (1946), where the Board
held the employer engaged in interference by attempting to distort grievances of its
American employees into issues of a racial nature in order to prejudice Mexican em-
ployees against affiliating with a union; National Lime & Stone Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 282
(1945), where the employer engaged in interference by appealing to Catholic employees
on the ground that the union, under John L. Lewis "had communistic ideas in it," and
reminded the employees that the church was opposed to communism; S.K. Wellman
Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 214 (1943), where the employer stated that if the union won, em-
ployees would be replaced by Negroes; E. Bigelow Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943), where
the employer told employees that if the union went into effect, the colored employees
would lose their jobs; Fred A. Snow Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1942), where the presi-
dent of the company threatened to quit and replace himself with his son, who was
anti-Negro; Rapid Roller Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 557 (1941), where the employer interfered
by asking for the removal of a Negro committeeman and by attempts to frighten
other union committeemen by actions designed by the employer to divide and weaken
the union; Arcade Sunshine Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 259 (1939), enforced in part, 118 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir. 1940), where the court held that the fact the employer told the employees
(most of whom were Negroes) that the union's attitude toward Negroes in the past
had not been friendly is a circumstance supporting the Board's finding of interference.
See also Interlake Iron Corp., 33 N.L.R.B. 613 (1941), enforced in part, 131 F.2d 129
(7th Cir. 1942).
11 Sovern, The NLRA and Racial Discrimination, 62 'Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962).
12 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
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kinds of election propaganda; and while it did not condone such
appeals to racism; the Board generally would not set aside an election
unless the statements made reference to or involved threats, misrepre-
sentations, fraud, violence or coercion.
Thus, in Kresge Newark, Inc., 18 the Board rejected the conten-
tion that good cause to set aside an election was shown where an
employer claimed that an official of a victorious union had said that
the employer would lay off colored workers unless they elected the
union to protect their jobs. The Board here held that even if this
statement were made, it constituted campaign propaganda which could
be evaluated by the employees and was not cause which would justify
the setting aside of an election.
Again, in the Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc. case" the employer
sent an eight page letter to his employees, which stated that the peti-
tioning union favored integration and among other things had con-
tributed $75,000 to the NAACP. The election took place in Madison,
North Carolina. The Board said of the letter:
We note that there is no misrepresentation, fraud, violence,
or coercion and that the statements here were temperate and
factually correct. They, therefore, afford no basis for setting
aside the results of the election."
In another case decided the same year a union lost an election
where the vice president of the company, a Negro, stated that he
was the reason for the advent of the union and that some of the
employees did not want to, in effect, work under him because of his
race and that the white employees were jealous of him because of his
position with the company." Again, the Board sustained the results
of the election, stating:
While we do not condone appeals to racial prejudice, nor the
conduct of the Company's vice-presidents in raising the issue,
we do not find that the injection of the issue, or the context in
which it was discussed herein, sufficient ground for invalida-
tion of the results. 17
In Heintz Div., Kelsey-Hayes Co.,' 8 on the day before the elec-
tion, the intervening union, an independent, selected eight non-em-
ployee male spectators at a ball game, five of whom were Negroes,
to distribute handbills promoting the rival UAW-CIO Union to em- -
18
 112 N.L.R.B. 869 (1955).
14
 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958).
15
 Id. at 751.
16 Chock Full O'Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1958).
17
 Id. at 1299.
18
 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960).
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ployees at the plant gate. The legend read, "Vote UAW-CIO—July
14." There was no identification on the handbill, nor did the distrib-
utors wear identification or in any way indicate that they were em-
ployed by the intervening union. The Board found that it was clear
that the intervenor caused the distribution to be made so as to lead
the employees reasonably to believe that it was sponsored by the
UAW-CIO. The intervenor won the election, and objections were filed
by the UAW. The Board set aside the election, stating that while it
will not ordinarily police the method of campaigning, it will not
hesitate to do so in cases of fraud or trickery. The Board asserted its
belief that the anonymous intrusion of the intervenor in the petitioner's
campaign constituted trickery which interfered with the ability of the
employees to evaluate properly the propaganda appeal. In order to
insure that its elections are conducted under proper laboratory condi-
tions, the Board held that the failure of parties in Board elections to.
identify themselves as sponsors of campaign propaganda initiated by
them constituted grounds for setting aside the election. This view
comports with the. standards laid down by Congress for national
elections" which prohibit the distribution and publication of cam-
paign propaganda without indicating the names of the individuals or
groups responsible for their issuance."
A modification of this policy was foreshadowed by statements
made by members of the Board after its membership changes during
the early part of 1961. In April of that year, Board Chairman Frank
W. McCulloch voiced his concern (as had former Chairman Leedom
and member Bean before him) 21 with the growing use of appeals to
prejudice in election campaigns. In an address delivered on April 19,
1961, the Chairman pointed out that
less familiar campaigning techniques which are today being
increasingly utilized and which arguably interfere with free
choice are the use of race hatred, religious intolerance and
professionally produced movies with a central theme that the
election of a union results in strikes and outside hooligans
terrorizing the community. 22
19 64 Stat. 475 (1950); 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1964).
20 See also Chillicothe Paper Co., 119 . N.L.R.B. 1263 (1958); Great Au. & Pat.
Tea Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 133 (1962).
21 See concurring opinions of Leedom & Bean, Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., supra
note 14; Leedom concurring and Bean and Murdock dissenting, Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957). The majority disposed of the latter case by overruling ob-
jections to the election relating to racial issues as being untimely filed under the Board's
rules and regulations, and, therefore, did not reach this crucial issue.
22
 Address by NLRB Chairman McCulloch, April 19, 1962, Eighth Annual Joint
Industrial Relations Conference at Michigan State University.
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Acknowledging the troublesome problems raised by these techniques,
Chairman McCulloch queried,
Should we equate the appeal to racial hate and religious intol-
erance with the defamatory matter with which we are ac-
quainted and which we generally permit; viz., that the boss
is a slave-driver, or that the union is only interested in dues.
If this equation does not ring true, what limits, if any, are
put on us by the First Amendment principles of free speech,
and what applicability do these principles have to an NLRB
conducted election?"
Board member Gerald A. Brown, referring to racial appeals
in an address during the same month stated,
One approach would be based on the view that appeals to
racial prejudice are in the nature of campaign propaganda,
that the Board is not a fair employment practices commission
and that, in short, this is not our business. The opposite ap-
proach would be that the Board, as an Agency of the Govern-
ment, is directly concerned in light of stated Federal policy
on the subject; and that Board should heed the Supreme
Court's admonition in Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. 31 ..
that the Board "has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it
may wholly ignore other and equally important Congres-
sional objectives." 24
Citing Supreme Court precedent, member Brown pointed out that
profane, libelous, false or insulting racial, utterances "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality"; in short, dissemination of such racial
appeals does not come within the scope of the constitutional
protection of free speech. 25
Thus, member Brown suggested that the Board had three choices
in election cases involving racial appeals. ft could consider all racial
appeals as unwarranted election interference; it could consider all such
appeals as permissible propaganda; or it could adopt some middle
view. If the latter course were adopted ". . . the truth, relevance, timing
23 Ibid.
24 Address by NLRB Member Brown, July 1962, Labor Law Section of the
Texas Bar Ass'n.
25 Ibid.
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and inflammatory nature of such appeals are factors which would be
given weight.""
The Board re-examined the issue in two cases" decided in 1962
and elected to choose the middle view. The Sewell' decision was
rendered on August 9, 1962. Several weeks before then the Board
had issued its landmark Dal-Tex Optical Co. decision," which held
that the free speech proviso of section 8(c) 3° had no application to
representation cases, thus reviving the General Shoe doctrine"- estab-
lished in 1943, and overruling the National Furniture Mfg. Co. deci-
sion' and other cases that had applied section 8(c) to hold certain
statements privileged in election cases. In Dal-Tex, the Board found
that the entire content of the employer's speeches generated fear of
economic loss and hostility toward unions, which destroyed the "labora-
tory conditions" under which the Board must hold elections. In the
Oak Mfg. Co. case" the Board held that while it recognized the em-
ployer's constitutional right of free speech, such right was not derived
from section 8(c) which is applicable to unfair labor practices but not
to representation cases."
26 Ibid.
27 Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 12; Allan-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73
(1962).
28 Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 12.
22 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
30 Section 8(c) of the act provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of the Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8, added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
31 General Shoe Corp., supra note 4.
82 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
33 141 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963). For other cases following Dal-Tex Optical Co.,
supra note 29, see General Indus. Electronics Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1964); Lord
Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963); Steel Equip, Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1158 (1963);
Marsh Supermkts., 140 N.L.R.B. 899 (1963).
34 The applicability of § S(c) to representation cases has run the full gamut. Note,
Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 231 (1962).
As aforementioned, the early Board cases indicated that, § 8(c) notwithstanding, if the
employees' free choice was interfered with, the election would be set aside. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950); General Shoe Corp., supra note 4. Later cases
held that an employer's speech was protected by § 8(c). Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113
N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955) ; Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1954) ; AS. Abell Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 362 (1953) ; National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953). These cases,
however, were specifically overruled by Dal-Tex Optical Co., supra note 29. Some courts
have stated that §\8(c) is no more than the first amendment restated. NLRB v. Corning
Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir.
1950); NLRB v. LaSalle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949). Thus, employers and
some commentators have urged that free speech, whether protected by § 8(c) or the
Constitution, still controls what an employer may state during a campaign. Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
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As noted previously" the Board had occasion in 1962 to re-examine
its prior determinations in this area. In the Sewell case" the employer,
two weeks before the election, had shown his employees a picture of
an unidentified Negro man dancing with an unidentified white woman.
Beneath the picture was the caption, "The C.I.O. Strongly Pushes
and Endorses the F.E.P.C." The same day the employer sent his
employees a reproduction of the front page of the Jackson (Mississippi)
Daily News, which contained a picture of a white man dancing with a
Negro woman. The caption beneath the picture read, "Union Leader
James B. Carey Dances with a Lady Friend—He is President of the
I.U.E., Which Seeks to Unionize Vickers Plant here." 37 Also beneath
this picture was a bold heading: "Race Mixing is an Issue as Vickers
Workers Ballot." This news coverage, coupled with the employer's
letters and his distribution of Militant Truth, was held to be
objectionable conduct. The Board stated:
We are faced in this case with a claim that by a deliberate,
sustained appeal to racial prejudice the Employer created
conditions which made impossible a reasoned choice of a
bargaining representative and therefore that the election
should be set aside."
This was not, as the Board was careful to point out, 3° a case involving
threats or promises with racial overtones. Nor did this resolve the
issue, for the second election was also set aside on substantially the
same grounds." "We find that the documents in question were intended
to and did inflame the racial feelings and other prejudices of the
voters on matters unrelated to election issues," stated the Board.4 '
A second case, Allen-Morrison Sign Co.,42 involved a lengthy
letter from the employer to his workers dealing primarily with matters
indisputably germane to the election, particularly the union's stated
Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 68-69 (1964). Contra, Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957). On the other hand, although the Supreme
Court supported the view that the first amendment protects an employee respecting
union organization, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940), under its totality of conduct doctrine, the Supreme Court held that
an employer's statement was coercive when considered in a background of anti-union
activities. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1941).
36 Supra note 27.
36 Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 12.
37 The lady with whom Mr. Carey was dancing happened to have been the wife
of an official of one of the new African nations and the occasion was a diplomatic
party held about five years previously.
38
 Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 12, at 70.
89
 Citing Grandwood Furniture Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1961), and Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957).
40 See Sewell Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
41 Id. at 221.
42 138 N.L.R.B. 13 (1962).
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position on race matters. This was followed two days before the elec-
tion with a letter which contained a one column reprint from an issue
of Militant Truth, the same magazine referred to in the Sewell case.
The Board restated the test laid down in the Sewell case:
So long, therefore, as a party limits itself to truthfully
setting forth another party's position on matters of racial
interest and does not deliberately seek to overstress and exac-
erbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals, we
shall not set aside an election on this ground. However, the
burden will be on the party making use of a racial message to
establish that it was truthful and germane, and where there is
doubt as to whether the total conduct of such party is within
the described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him."
Thus, the Board declined to set aside the election, concluding the
employer's letter was temperate in tone and that the excerpt from
Militant Truth may have been related to the choice before the voters.
Since the Sewell and Allen-Morrison cases, the Board has had
occasion to apply this test in other election cases. In the Archer
Laundry Workers case," the union prevailed in a hotly contested
election by a vote of 68 to 59 in a unit predominantly comprised of
Negro voters. The historic background leading up to the election re-
vealed that employees of several Baltimore, Maryland laundries had
approached a prominent Negro clergyman with complaints about labor
conditions at their respective places of employment. Various Negro
leaders and organizations became interested and, banding together,
contacted the AFL-CIO leadership. The result was a joint meeting
with the International Laundry Workers Union which agreed to con-
duct an organizational campaign with the mutual aid and assistance
of the Negro community and various interested organizations.
The employer filed objections to the conduct of the election on
seven grounds alleging, inter alia, that the union, in conjunction with
the various other groups had engaged in a deliberate and sustained
campaign of inflammatory and intemperate appeals to the racial emo-
tions and prejudices of Archer's employees, thus creating an atmos-
phere under which a free and fair expression of employees' choice was
impossible. Citing Sewell, the employer pointed, inter alia, to an illus-
trated leaflet headed Freedom Is Everybody's Fight. The leaflet
bore the legends, "Dogs couldn't stop us, Police brutality couldn't stop
us, Fire hoses couldn't stop us," and ended with the query, "Are you
going to let your boss stop you? A yes vote for the Union is a vote
42 Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 12, at 71-72
44 Archer Laundry Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1965), rev'd, — F.2d — (4th Cir. 1966),
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for freedom.' Another leaflet, attributed to the Maryland Civic
Interest group, portrayed pickets with signs protesting segregation and
asking employees to support the AFL-CIO and exhorting them to join
in the fight for better wages, hours and working conditions. Still another
leaflet queried, "What does Martin Luther King, Jr. have to say about
labor unions?" 46 and ended with the exhortation that the labor hater
is almost always "a twinheaded creature spewing anti-Negro talk from
one mouth and anti-union propaganda from the other." In an article
published in a local newspaper, the Baltimore Afro-American, the
regional director of the AFL-CIO was quoted as saying that the only
inflammatory racial issue involved in the campaign was the poverty of
the colored Archer laundry workers and the affluence of the white
owners. 47 Because of their joint venture, the Board agreed with the
employer that the union was responsible for the individual acts of the
various community groups and the literature disseminated by them.
The Board also agreed that the group did appeal to racial self-conscious-
ness. However, the Board held that their conduct did not warrant
setting aside the election.
The Board compared the Archer case with the Sewell case, point-
ing out that in Sewell the picture of the white union leader dancing
with a Negro woman graphically implied that unionism would bring
in its wake social and physical race mixing and that the theme was
a union demand for racial integration, socialistic legislation and free
range of communist conspirators. On the other hand, in Archer, the
theme, while based upon a racial issue, bore different implications.
Here the Negro laundry workers were told that because they were
Negroes, they were discriminated against in the economic sphere; that
in the past they had received lower wages and poorer working condi-
tions because they were Negroes. The Board found that they were
urged to join a union, not as an act against the white race but to
permit concerted action which could bring Negroes equality with the
white workers.
As stated in one communication directed to the workers during
the campaign: "It is a simple fact that colored workers who belong
to unions are far better off than those who don't.'" 48 The Board con-
cluded that the literature distributed did not deliberately seek to
invoke the hatred of Negro employees against the white people nor
was it designed to appeal to or engender race hatred, but instead, to
racial self-consciousness and racial pride. Nor was it, as in Sewell, a
deliberate attempt to overstress and exacerbate racial feeling by ir-
46 58 L.R.R.M. at 1213-14.
46 Ibid.
47 Id. at 1215.
48 Id. at 1214.
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relevant and inflammatory appeals, but rather to strike deep into the
very core of the traditional appeal for economic betterment. Accord-
ingly, the material in this case was held to constitute privileged cam-
paign propaganda and not valid grounds for setting the election aside.
II. APPLICATION TO UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CASES
Until recently, the NLRB has not involved itself directly in the
application of unfair labor practice principles to racial discrimina-
tion." However, within the past five years the Board, in several well
publicized decisions, has extended its prior determinations involving
a statutory bargaining representative's duty of fair representation as
well as the responsibilities of both the employer and the representa-
tive to refrain from racial discrimination. The initial case in such a
recent trend is Miranda Fuel Co." This pilot case had a checkered
career. In the first Miranda case the Board found that the delegation
to the union to determine the seniority of employees violated sec-
tions 8(a) (3) and (1) as well as sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (1) .(A)."
The facts in the case show that under the union's contract, drivers were
able to take leaves of absence during the slack period and then return
with full seniority rights, providing they had reported to the shop
steward by a particular date. When the charging party in the instant
49 This is not to say that the Board has not in the past considered threats of or dis-
crimination relating to race, religion or creed in conjunction with anti-union campaigns as
evidence of unfair labor practices. See Robert Meyer Hotel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 38
(1965) (threat to replace employees with white employees); Borg-Warner Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 949 (1964) (threat to white employees that they would have to associate
with Negroes); Boyce Mach. Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 756 (1963) (threat to Negroes that
if union won union would replace them); Associated Grocers, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468
(1961) (advertising for white replacements during Negro organizational campaign);
Petroleum Carrier Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1960) (threat to employ Negroes);
Empire Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958) (threat that union will hire Negroes);
Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949) (reading anti-union poem to Negro employees
at segregated picnic); Reeves Rubber, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 366 (1945), enforced, 153
F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1946) (threat that plant would be run by Negroes and Mexicans);
Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 57 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1944), enforcement denied, 147 F.2d 353
(5th Cir. 1945) (if union came in, Mexicans would have their jobs); Planters Mfg.
Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 735 (1938); cases collected in note 10 supra.
90
 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
91
 Miranda Fuel Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959).
92 Id. at 457. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) forbid employers and labor
organizations from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by § 7. Section 7 guarantees employees the right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively and to engage in con-
certed activities as well as the right to refrain from any of such activities. Section
8(a)(3) prohibits employers from discriminating in hiring or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment which tends to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization. Section 8(b)(2) prohibits a labor organization from
causing or attempting to cause an employer to engage in discrimination against an
employee which tends to encourage or discourage union membership.
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case reported later than .the date arranged in the contract, the union
placed this individual on the bottom. of the seniority list. When the
union found out that the charging party had not been able to report
due to illness, it refused to place him at his proper seniority, contend-
ing that he had left work prior to the commencement of the slack
period. In 1960 the Board's order was enforced by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit" which agreed with the Board that the delega-
tion of seniority rights improperly encouraged union membership and
violated the sections referred to above. However, in 1961, the Supreme
Court held, in Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB," that the mere granting
of exclusive authority to a union to determine seniority was not a per
se violation. With the reversal of the delegation of seniority doctrine,
the Miranda case was remanded to the Board in light of the Local
357, Teamsters case.
In December 1962 the Board came down with its second decision
in Miranda." The majority of the Board found that the discrimination
against the charging party was arbitrary and without legitimate pur-
pose and, therefore, that it had the foreseeable effect of encouraging
union membership. The majority held that the union and the employer
had violated sections 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8(a) (1) respectively, in that
employees must be given the right to be free from "unfair or irrelevant
or invidious treatment."" These rights were protected under section
7 of the act against union or employer intrusion. In addition, the
majority found a violation of sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (a) (3), since the
discrimination involved herein encouraged membership in the labor
organization.
In support of its position, the majority in Miranda relied on the
Supreme Court cases under the Railway Labor Act, Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R.," and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen."
Moreover, it referred to a case involving the Board where the Supreme
Court held: "When the . • Union accepted certification as the bargain-
ing representative for the group, it accepted a trust. It became bound
to represent equally and in good faith the interests of the whole
group."" Between the time of the decisions in Steele and Tunstall
and the instant case, the Board has recognized and applied the doc-
trine that a bargaining representative has a duty to represent all mem-
53
 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).
54
 365 U.S. 667 (1961), reversing Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
837 (1954).
55 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 50.
56 Id. at 190.
57 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
58 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
59
 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 50, at 184, citing Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
585
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
bers of the unit equally and without discrimination on the basis of race,
color or creed." Applying this doctrine, the majority held that under
section 7 of the act employees have the right to be free from unfair,
irrelevant or invidious treatment by the bargaining agent; 81. and
where an employer participates in this action with the union, both
violate the act. The majority, relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Radio Officers' Union," then went on to conclude that the
joint action herein by the employer and the union violated sections
8(a) (3 ) and 8 (b) (2), since the foreseeable result of the discrimina-
tion was to encourage membership in the union."
The dissent agreed that the statutory bargaining representative
has a duty under section 9(a) of the act" to represent the interests of
all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and impartially. It con-
tended, however, that the unfair labor practice provisions may not be
violated merely by a failure to represent all employees fairly and that
Congress did not intend to make discrimination of this nature viola-
tive of the act.
In support of its position, it cited NLRB v. Drivers Local (Curtis
Bros.)" where the Supreme Court dealt at length with the limitations
of the Board's powers, with specific reference to section 8(b) (1) (A)
of the NLRA. In Curtis, the union involved was not the representa-
tive of a majority of employees, and it sought by way of peaceful
picketing to compel immediate recognition from the employer. The
Board found that such recognitional picketing restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under section 7 in that
the picketing coerced the employer into forcing its employees to be
represented by a union not of their choice and thus constituted an un-
fair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A)." The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the Board's order,
holding that section 8 (b) (1) (A) was inapplicable to peaceful picketing,
whether organizational or recognitional in nature.67
 The Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit and refused to apply 8(b) (1) (A). After an exten-
sive review of the legislative history" of the Taft-Hartley Act and
60
 Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
61
 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 50, at 185.
82
 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
63 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 50, at 190; see Cox, supra note 34, where argu-
ments pro and con were posed by the author; Sovern, supra note 11.
64
 This section provides that the representative designated by a majority of em-
ployees in an appropriate unit for collective bargaining shall be the exclusive repre-
sentative for all the employees in said unit.
65
 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
86
 Curtis Bros. Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
87
 Drivers Local v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
68 1 Legislative History of Labor Management Relations Act 99, 112, 158, 178-89,
292, 321, 407, 456 (1948).
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specifically section 8(b) (1) (A) of that act, the Court concluded that
Congress intended that this section apply only to union tactics involving
violence, intimidation and reprisal, as well as conduct involving more
than the general pressures upon employees implicit in economic
strikes. 69
The dissent in Miranda utilized the pronouncement of the
Court in Curtis to argue that the same result follows in the in-
stant case; namely, that Congress had no intention to apply section
8 (b) (1) (A) to the facts herein, but only to tactics involving violence,
intimidation and reprisal, or threats thereof. Moreover, with respect
to the contention of the majority that sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3)
were applicable here, the dissent noted that the facts in the instant
case showed no evidence of a desire to encourage or discourage union
membership. Thus, with no specific evidence of such a desire, it could
have been neither inferred nor a foreseeable result of such conduct.
In December 1963 the Board's second Miranda decision reached
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." The court
denied enforcement of the Board's decision with a panel of the court
split three ways. Judge Medina rejected the Board's entire theory
that unfair, irrelevant or invidious treatment of an employee is a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation and held that in any
event it would not amount to an unfair labor practice. Judge Lumbard
concurred in the refusal to enforce the Board's decision, but did so on
the ground that there was no evidence that the union had violated
its duty of fair representation. Judge Lumbard considered it un-
necessary to decide if such unfair action, unrelated to union member-
ship, could amount to an unfair labor practice. Judge Friendly dis-
sented in favor of the Board's majority decision, concluding that such
arbitrary exercise of union power encouraged union membership. He
suggested that it would be desirable to have these cases processed
through the Board since the ability of the aggrieved employee to proceed
in court against an employer is limited by the usual arbitration provi-
sions.
Since the Miranda decision, the Board has had occasion to review
its determination while applying it to other factual situations. In Ohio
Pipeline Constr. Co.," the union failed to re-register one of its mem-
bers, thereby causing him not to be referred for employment. The
trial examiner found that the union had violated sections 8(b) (1) (A)
and (2), relying on the Miranda test of the right of employees to be
free from unfair, irrelevant or invidious treatment. However, a Board
69 362 U.S. at 290 (1960),
	 *
70
 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
71
 144 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1963).
587
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
majority, consisting of members Leedom and Brown, disagreed with
the trial examiner and found that the mere fact that the union had
failed to re-register an employee could not be treated as coming
under the Miranda principle. They stated: "Mere forgetfulness or
inadvertent error is not the type of conduct that the principles of
Miranda were intended to reach.' Ten days later, in New York
Times Co.," the Board again refused to find a violation under the
Miranda doctrine. There the union, in order to give work to those who
needed it rather than to those who bad full-time positions elsewhere,
determined that one union member who was employed elsewhere was
"not at trade." This classification affected his opportunity for regular
employment. The Board held that such a determination of classifica-
tion was not arbitrary or invidious, but rather a reasonable classifica-
tion. 74
On the same day that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed
into law, the Board issued a decision in Hughes Tool Co.' finding a
union guilty of unfair labor practices, and stripping it of its certification
• as bargaining representative, because of its racially discriminatory
practices. The reasoning of the Board was based on the rationale in
Miranda. The facts in Hughes showed that for the past five years em-
ployees .had been represented by two locals, one representing white,
and the other representing Negro employees. In 1961, after the two
local unions were unable to agree with the employer on a proposal for
eliminating racial discrimination, the white local signed a contract
with the employer while the Negro local refused to sign. Shortly there-
after the employer and the white local agreed to enlarge a number of
apprenticeships. However, under the contract terms, they were only
available to white employees. A Negro bid for one of these apprentice-
ships, and, when rejected, asked the white local to represent him in
processing a grievance. 7° The white local did not reply to his request,
and he then filed a charge alleging violation of section 8(b) (1) (A)
(i.e., restraining and coercing employees). The Negro local then filed a,
motion to rescind the certification of the white local, contending that
the existence of the segregated locals and the white local's practice of
discrimination rendered its certification invalid. The Board was unan-
imous in its decision to revoke the union's certification and relied on
72 Id. at 1368.
73
 144 N.L.R.B. 1555 (19 63).
74
 For similar results, see United States Trucking Corp.
Houston Chronicle Publ. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1657 (1964);
Corp.), 144 N.L.R.B. 798 (196 3).
75
 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (19 64).
70
 See NLRB v. General 'Motors Corp., 307 F.2d 679
Too! Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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its decision in Pioneer Bus Co." In addition, the Board was in full
agreement as to the finding of a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A), al-
though the reasoning for both the majority and the dissent was sub-
stantially different. The majority, relying on its prior determination
in Miranda, applied the Steele and Tunstall cases in noting that there
was a duty of fair representation, and, accordingly, such a duty of fair
representation was enforceable under sections 7 and 8 of the act.
Where a union violates this duty, the majority held that it also restrains
and coerces employees in violation of section 7 rights. In addition to
the violation of section 8(b)(1) (A), the majority also found viola-
tions of sections 8(b) (2) and (3), notwithstanding the fact that the
complaint issued by the General Counsel had not alleged violation of
these latter provisions. 78
The dissent found, as noted above, a violation of 8(b) (1) (A)
solely on the ground that the union had discriminated against the
Negro employee because he was not a member of its local, and not
because the union did not perform its duty of fair representation.
Although the dissent agreed that a union has a duty of fair representa-
tion, it concluded that such a failure to fairly represent may not
amount to an unfair labor practice, yet may result in the revocation
of a certification. In relying on such a conclusion, the dissent looked
to the legislative history of section 7 and concluded that the purpose
of the passage of the act herein was primarily to protect the organiza-
tional rights of employees. The dissent noted that if the Board is
to embark on this new field of racial discrimination amounting to unfair
labor practices, it will be entering an area for which it has no prepara-
tion and which is likely to seriously interfere with its present activities.
Quoting specifically from the dissent:
What we are confronted with is an important question of
policy which should be resolved not by logomachy, but by a
careful weighing of alternatives in the light of the ends to be
achieved. Where specific statutory rights or prohibitions are
not involved, should enforcement of the duty of fair repre-
sentation be left to the courts, to the Board, or both? In such
circumstances, should cases of breach of this duty insofar as
they involve race discrimination be treated differently from
breaches involving nonracial factors? If a separate agency
is created to handle the task of eliminating employment dis-
crimination by unions and employers based on race, should
the Board have a duty in this field? If so, what should it be?
77
 140 N.L.R.S. 54 (1962).
78
 For an explanation of §1 7, 8(b)(I)(A)
	 8(b)(2), see note 52 supra. Section
8(b)(3) prohibits a labor organization that represents a majority of employees in an
appropriate unit from refusing to bargain in good faith with an employer.
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To ask these questions is to appreciate that the problem with
which we are presented is legislative to be resolved by the
Congress and not by an administrative body whose duty it is
only to administer the law which Congress has written. . . .
Accordingly, we would rest our finding of a violation of
8(b)(1) (A) not on non-performance of the duty of fair
representation, but on those other considerations present in
this case which Congress brought within the unfair labor
practice ambit of the statute."
Aside from the procedural problem raised by the fact the General
Counsel in the Hughes case did not allege in its complaint violations
of section 8(b) (2) and 8 (b) (3), the dissent noted that in accordance
with its position in Miranda, a mere refusal to process a grievance
cannot amount to an attempt to cause discrimination against an em-
ployee in violation of 8(a) (3) of the act. Here, as in Miranda, there
was no encouragement or discouragement of membership in a labor
organization, and, therefore, there could not have been a violation of
section 8(b) (2). Moreover, the dissent pointed out that section
8(b) (3) outlined a bargaining duty owed by the union to employers
and not to employees; further, Congress did not intend that a
violation of the duty of fair representation to its members would
be an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (3). Accordingly, it
was the position of the dissent that except for a violation of section
8(b)(1) (A) based upon discrimination concerning non-union mem-
bership, there could be no violation of the act, notwithstanding the
fact that there clearly was a failure to perform the duty of fair rep-
resentation which unanimously caused revocation of the certification
herein.
In Galveston Maritime Assin," the Board restated its prior deci-
sions in Miranda and Hughes with the same result. In Galveston, the
union forced a work distribution based upon race, as well as union mem-
bership, and forbade white and Negro gangs from working together.
The entire Board found a violation of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b)
(2) by the union's distribution arrangement based upon union and non-
union considerations 8x However, the majority, in addition to the dis-
crimination based upon non-membership, relied on Miranda and
Hughes in finding a violation of section 8 (b) (2), stating that the ac-
tion engaged in by the union concerning work quotas constituted ir-
7° Hughes Tool Co., supra note 75, at 1590.
80 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
81
 The entire Board was also in agreement that the union herein had violated
§ 8(b)(1)(A) by punishing members for having filed unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. See Local 138, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679
(1964).
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relevant, invidious and) unfair consideration of race and union mem-
bership. Moreover, the majority held that under the statute herein,
a labor organization's duty to bargain collectively includes the duty
to represent fairly. The majority found a violation of section 8(b) (3).
They concluded that "when a statutory representative negotiates a
contract in breach of the duty which it owes to employees to repre-
sent all of them fairly and without invidious discrimination, the rep-
resentative cannot be said to have negotiated ... in good faith as to
the employees whom it represents or toward the employer.""
In Maremont Corp." the Board again reviewed the past decisions
in this area. The facts showed that after the employer's tool and die
shop had been relocated, the union's negotiating committee, composed
mainly of Negroes, asked the employer to decrease the departmental
seniority of the tool and die shop employees, who were all white. The
employer agreed, and as a result, these white employees lost seniority
built up with the employer. The Board, comprising a panel of Chair-
man McCulloch and members Leedom and Jenkins, all agreed that
the union, as well as the employer, had violated the act, but each had
his own reasons for such a conclusion. Member Leedom concluded that
there was racial discrimination by the union against the white em-
ployees and that the union, therefore, had failed to fulfill its duty of
fair representation in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). In addition,
member Leedom found that such action by the union amounted to an
attempt to cause discrimination in violation of section 8(b)(2). Ac-
cordingly, the employer's acquiescence in such an agreement had vio-
lated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act. Member Leedom's conclu-
sions in the Maremont case were based on the majority decisions in
Hughes, Miranda and Galveston. Chairman McCulloch found a viola-
tion of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) in view of the fact that the
union's conduct was motivated at least in part by union considerations.
Here the white employees of the shop had in the past opposed the
officers of the union. Therefore, it was concluded that such action taken
against them was in part due to their past opposition. In addition,
the employer's submission to the union's unlawful demands had violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3). Member Jenkins was of the opinion that
the union's conduct was not based on personal animosity toward the
employees because of their race, but that the union, consisting of a
substantial number of Negro employees, had attempted to vitiate the
effects of years of racial discrimination in the shop. However, he found
a violation of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) because he felt the
82 Galveston Maritime Ass'n, supra note 80, at 900. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Central of Ga. R.R. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
83
 149 N.L.R B. No. 482 (1964).
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union's conduct was based on unfair, irrelevant and invidious, as
well as union considerations.
In Business League of Gadsen, 84 the Board members reiterated
their respective positions on the application of the act to racial dis-
crimination. In this case the employer and the union permitted racial
job discrimination by means of racial seniority rosters, with certain
jobs allocated. to white employees and others to Negroes. White em-
ployees with less seniority than Negroes were entitled to greater op-
portunity for promotion and transfer. When one Negro employee bid
on a job, it was refused him by the employer on the ground the job was
a "white job," and when he filed grievances with the union concerning
the refusal, the union refused to process his complaint. Other com-
plainants filed grievances with the union to eliminate the discriminatory
practices, and the union refused to process them as well. The majority
of the Board, consisting of members Leedom, Brown and Jenkins, re-
stated its position in Hughes," Galveston" and Miranda' to the effect
that such racial discrimination by a bargaining representative violates
sections 8(b) (1) (A), (2) and (3). Moreover, refusal, based on racial
grounds, to process a grievance on behalf of a member of the bargain-
ing unit constituted such a violation. The majority noted that in Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman Co., 88 the Court had held that the statutory
obligation of a collective bargaining agent is to represent all members
equally and to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all without
hostility to any. Moreover, the Court in Ford Motor Co. had further
stated that the range of discretion allowed to a statutory representative
is accompanied and limited by a requirement that such representative
consistently exercise complete good faith and honesty of purpose.
After reciting the statutory duty of a bargaining agent to all its
members, the majority in Business League proceeded to make several
comments concerning the dissent's position. The dissent had concluded
that there were no unfair labor practices committed because there was
no discrimination due to non-membership in the union. However,
the majority pointed out that in the Hughes decision; the present dis-
senters had found a violation of section 8(b) (1)(A) on the basis that
the individual involved was a non-union member. The majority then
observed that the dissent's position in Hughes and in the instant case
led to a curious result, for it could be argued therefrom that employees
who followed the route of self-organization and became members of
a labor organization obtained less protection than did the non-member
84 150 N.L.R,B. No. 18 (1964).
85
 Hughes Tool Co., supra note 75.
86 Galveston Maritime Ass'n, supra note 80.
87
 Miranda FueI Co., supra note 51.
88
 Supra note 82.
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in Hughes. In addition to commenting on the inconsistent position
that the dissent was alleged to haire taken, the majority referred to the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and stated:
We are not unmindful that in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 the Congress has legislated concerning racial dis-
crimination by labor organizations. But the reach of Title
VII goes far beyond such discrimination, proscribing as it
does discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin by employers, employment agencies, and
joint labor-management committees, as well as labor organiza-
tions. Moreover, the Board's powers and duties are in no way
limited by Title VII. On June 12, 1964, before the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Senate rejected by a vote of
59 to 29 an amendment to Title VII which had been proposed
by Senator Tower (R, Texas) and which perhaps would have
had the effect of limiting the Board's powers. See the Congres-
sional Record (daily copy) 88th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.
13171-73. The proposed amendment reads:
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
Sec. 717. Beginning on the effective date of sections 703,
704, 706, and 707 of this title, as provided in section 716, the
provisions of this title shall constitute the exclusive means
whereby any department, agency, or instrumentality in the
executive branch of the Government, or any independent
agency of the United States, may grant or seek relief from, or
pursue any remedy with respect to, any employment practice
of any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee covered by this title, if
such employment practice may be the subject of a charge or
complaint filed under this title."
The dissent in Business League took the opportunity to re-
state its position in view of the allegations of inconsistency attributed
to it by the majority. The dissent noted the following: (1) Under sec-
tion 9 of the act a bargaining representative owes a duty fairly and
impartially to represent all employees; (2) there is nothing in the word-
ing of sections 7 or 8 and nothing in the legislative history to make the
right of fair representation protected under section 7; (3) although
there is such a duty of fair representation, a violation of it may not
amount to an unfair labor practice, but it is sufficient reason for re-
voking the certification; (4) a union may violate section 8(b) (1) (A)
80 150 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1964).
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by refusing to process a grievance where the refusal is based on the
individual's non-membership or on ' other considerations specifically
condemned by the statute. The dissent went on to point out that where,
as in the present case, and as distinguished from Hughes, the union
refuses to process a grievance for a particular member of its organiza-
tion, there can be no violation of 8 (b) (1)(A). In Hughes the em-
ployee's non-membership in the union was a factor in the union's refusal
to process the grievance but not so in the present case. The mere fact
that the breach of the duty of fair representation results in the revoca-
tion of the certification cannot mean that it therefore follows that an
unfair labor practice has been committed."
Notwithstanding the views of the dissent, the Board majority has
continued to hold that an employer's submission to a union's discrimina-
tory demands is not only a breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion but also an unfair labor practice on the part of both employer
and union."
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS IT AFFECTS
CONTRACT BAR RULES
In order to encourage and preserve the stability of labor relations,
the Board has, with certain well defined exceptions, adhered to a policy
of not directing an election among employees presently covered by a
valid collective bargaining agreement. The question whether a present
election is barred by an outstanding contract is determined according
to the Board's "contract bar" rules. Generally these rules require that
in order to be a bar the contract must be in writing, be properly ex-
ecuted and be binding upon the parties; that the contract be of no more
than "reasonable" duration (presently limited to three years) ; and that
90
 Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Tanner
Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), enforced a Board order, 148 N.L.R.B. 1402
(1964), in a case related to those detailed above. The Board had held that employees
picketing their employer's premises in protest against the employer's discriminatory
hiring practices concerning Negroes were engaged in protected activity within the
meaning of the act. The Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's determination that such
employees were engaged in protected concerted activity, relying on NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1961). However, the case was remanded to the Board to
give consideration to the fact that in the instant case there was a collective bargaining
representative, and the employees did not proceed through such representative.
si Maremont Corp., supra note 83. However, in March 1965, the Board held that
the discharge of an employee who had refused to join a racially segregated union was
not a violation of the duty of fair representation since the direct cause of discharge
was an unsatisfactory work performance, and since the evidence was insufficient to
show that the union attempted to cause his discharge for unlawful reasons. Theo Hamm
Brewing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (1965). Cf. Robert Meyer Hotel Co., supra note 49,
where the Board reversed the trial examiner in finding the discharge of its Negro maids
and bus gills in violation of the act.
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the contract contain substantive terms and conditions of employment
which are consistent with the policies of the act."
The Board has had only one occasion to apply its contract bar
rules to contracts which inherently discriminated against Negro em-
ployees. In Pioneer Bus Co." the employer and the incumbent union
entered into two contracts, one affecting only the white employees and
the other the Negro workers. Although the contracts contained iden-
tical terms and conditions of employment, separate seniority lists were
maintained and separate representational treatment took place based
upon racial lines. The Board held that it would not permit its contract
bar rules to be utilized to shield contracts such as the instant ones since
thciy resulted in the disparate and discriminatory treatment of Negroes.
Accordingly, the Board held that the contracts did not serve as a
bar to an election.
Although instances like Pioneer Bus Co. have been rare, it would
appear likely that the Board will, in the future, continue to treat all
contracts for separate groups of employees based upon racial determina-
tions as not being a bar to a representation petition and, accordingly,
to an election."
IV. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS IT AFFECTS REVOCATION
OF UNION CERTIFICATIONS
The Supreme Court has held that the authority of bargaining rep-
resentatives is not absolute in that they have a statutory obligation to
represent all members of the appropriate unit and must make an honest
effort to serve the interest of all members equally." The Board has
applied such a rationale in revoking a representative's certification. The
first case was Larus & Brother Co." In that case the Board held that
since the certified union had failed to perform its full statutory duty
by discriminating against Negro employees, its certification would have
been rescinded bad it not been voluntarily relinquished 87
92 Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958); Appalachian Shale Prods.
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958); General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
93 Supra note 77.
04 See Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 771, 778 (1965), where the author gives his views on the
effectiveness of this remedy. He states, "This remedy also constitutes a serious threat
only to weak unions. A strong union would win the election even if it were held."
95 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra note 82; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra
note 57; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, supra note 58; Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1951).
96 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
07 Coleman Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 120 (1952); Bronx County News Corp., 89
N.L.R.B. 1567 (1950); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945); General
Motors Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 427 (1945); Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 61 N.L.R.B.
1217 (1945); R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 61 N.L.R.B. 112 (1945) ; Carter Mfg. Co.,
59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944); Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
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More recently, in Hughes Tool Co.," the Board had occasion to
further detail its revocation rule. In that case the union required the
payment of certain monies by non-members for the handling of
grievances. The Board held that inasmuch as the union was obliged to
represent all employees, union or non-union equally, this practice
abused the standard of conduct to which the certified union must ad-
here. The Board noted that although there may be a concurrent remedy
under the unfair labor practice provisions of the act, this was not a
barrier to its consideration of a motion to revoke under section 9. It
is interesting to note that the dissent in Hughes was of the opinion
that such conduct committed by the statutory bargaining representa-
tive could be brought to the Board's attention only through the unfair
labor practice procedure. However, it wasn't until the Miranda case
came before the Board that the unfair labor practice procedure was
utilized." Since the Larus case and the 1953 Hughes case the Board,
in several other cases not involving racial matters, has revoked the
certification where the bargaining representative has not fairly rep-
resented all the employees in the appropriate unit.'" It appears clear
that Board policy, as recently stated in the latest Hughes case, 10 ' re-
quires certification revocation when a statutory bargaining represen-
tative engages in racial discrimination.
V. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS IT AFFECTS APPROPRIATENESS
OF BARGAINING UNITS
The NLRA requires an employer to bargain with the representa-
tive designated by a majority of its employees in a unit appropriate for
collective bargaining.' 02 Moreover, the Board has the power to deter-
mine the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining pur-
poses.'" In the past the Board has consistently held that racial distinc-
tions are irrelevant in determining the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit.'°4
 Where a party insists on the inclusion or exclusion of individ-
See also Veneer Prods., 81 N.L.R.B. 492 (1949). In these cases the Board reminded the
parties that later evidence of discrimination will cause revocation of a certification.
98 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
99
 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 50.
100 A. G. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
101 Hughes Tool Co., supra note 98.
102 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.	 159(a) (1964).
103 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
104 Andrews Indus., Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 946 (1953); Norfolk Southern Bus
Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948); F. S. Royster Guano Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1947);
Foley Lumber & Export Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 73 (1946); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,
67 N.L.R.B. 100 (1946); Tobacco By-Prods. & Chem. Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 252 (1945);
U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.I3. 382 (1943); Southern Wood Preserving Co., 37 N.L.R.B.
25 (1941); Aetna Iron & Steel Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 136 (1941); Georgia Power Co., 32
N.L.R.B. 692 (1941). Cf. Syracuse Chilled Plow Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 717, 719 (1945).
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uals based on racial grounds, the Board has refused to consider such
arguments but rather has determined the appropriateness of units
upon relevant considerations. It would appear that the Board will ad-
here to this consistent practice, especially in view of its more recent
determinations concerning racial discrimination in other areas referred
to herein.
VI. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" 5 very generally pro-
scribes as unlawful employment practices discrimination relating to
the hiring, firing and other conditions of employment of an individual
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex or national origin and
for a union to do likewise, particularly with respect to membership
in a union. The NLRA, on the other hand, generally proscribes, as
unfair labor practices, discrimination practiced against an employee
because of his union activities or because of his concerted activities
for mutual aid or protection in matters relating to wages, hours or
other conditions of employment. As regards unions, the act forbids
them to coerce or restrain an employee in the exercise of his section
7 rights"' or to cause or attempt to cause his discharge for reasons
other than the failure of the employee to tender his periodic dues and
initiation fees.
Thus, a literal reading of the NLRA shows that there is nothing
in the act to prevent an employer from discharging an employee be-
cause he does not like the color of his eyes, or for any reason or no
reason, provided that the discharge is not attributable to the employee's
activities on behalf of the labor organization or because he engaged
in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. On the other hand,
the Civil Rights Act would make many of such discharges unlawful
employment practices.
There are certain statutory procedural distinctions between the
two agencies. Title VII provides that the Civil Rights Commission
shall "cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, state,
local, and other agencies, both public and private, and individuals."'"
Moreover, after having reasonable cause to believe that a violation
has been committed, the Commission is instructed to eliminate such
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation and persuasion.'" Where such efforts do not achieve com-
pliance, the aggrieved person then may file a civil action in the federal
105 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
108 See note 56 supra.
107 78 Stat. 258 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1) (1964).
108 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C.
	 2000e-5(a) (1964).
597
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
courts. However, the Commission itself may not file such enforce-
ment action, and must, in several instances, await action by the state
before it or the aggrieved person may proceed?' Thus, the Commis-
sion's activities are highlighted by their conciliatory characteristics,
as distinguished from the NLRB which is primarily an enforcement
agency which is neither self-energizing nor empowered to engage in
conciliation or mediation.
The new act does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Civil Rights
Commission over matters relating to employment discrimination. In
this connection, on April 8, 1964, Senator Clark stated, Title VII
"would not affect the present operation of any part of the National
Labor Relations Act or rights under existing labor laws." 110 Moreover,
as noted above,'" Senator Tower offered an amendment to the Civil
Rights Act on June 12, 1964 giving to the Commission exclusive juris-
diction in the disposition of civil rights cases, and such proposal was
rejected by the Senate, thus lending support to the conclusion that
the Civil Rights Act has no pre-emptive effect on rights arising under
the NLRA. Consistent with this view is the recent Board determina-
tion in Business League of Gadsden."'
In contrast to this, the jurisdiction of the NLRB has not been
extended by recent legislation. Thus, bills such as Senator Prouty's,
which would have made racial discrimination an unfair labor practice
under the jurisdiction of the Board, as a substitute for Title VII, were
defeated.'" As far back as May 5, 1953, a bill introduced in the Senate
to make it an unfair labor practice to discriminate on the basis of
race, religion, color or national ancestry was not even reported out of
the Committee on Public Welfare."' Therefore, it appears clear that
while racial discrimination is not a literal violation of the NLRA,
nothing contained in the Civil Rights Act detracts from or affects the
statutory authority of the NLRB to proceed affirmatively in appropri-
ate cases involving discrimination.
Despite the mild expressions of concern voiced by some commenta-
tors,' the overlapping jurisdiction of the Board and the Commission
does not appear to pose a threat to the effective operation of either
153 Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, classified Title VII as a most significant breakthrough
but felt that Board procedures would be easier, Iess costly to the individual, and more
widely applicable than the fair employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act. 56
LRRM Analysis 39.
110 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964).
111 Supra note 89.
112 Supra note 84.
113 S. 1837, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
114 S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
115
 Sherman, supra note 94; Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
684, 690 (1965).
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agency or create a serious conflict when their day-to-day operations
are considered. Thus, such matters under the NLRA as (a) setting
aside representation elections where there is a deliberate attempt to
overstress and exacerbate racial feelings and emotions by irrelevant
inflammatory appeals; (b) revoking a union's certification where the
union violated its duty of fair representations; (c) departing from the
Board's general contract bar rule by holding that an existing collective
bargaining agreement will not constitute a bar to a present election
because of the incumbent union's failure to abide by its duty of fair
representation; and (d) refusing to consider racial distinctions in unit
determinations, all clearly pose no conflict between the Board and
the Commission.
In these highly specialized areas the Board has jurisdiction as
well as the expertise to make determinations in accordance with the
authority vested in it under the NLRA. Notwithstanding the Board's
mandate in the representation field, the Commission undoubtedly will
have limited occasion to act concurrently with the Board in connection
with identical factual situations involving discriminatory practices,
and there may well be dual remedies depending upon the nature of
the proceeding before each agency. The only significant area in which
an overlapping of jurisdiction may occur relates to the finding by the
Board that under some circumstances the duty of fair representation
constitutes an unfair labor practice, relying on its rationale in the
Miranda and Hughes cases.
In assessing the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board in unfair
labor practice cases involving racial discrimination, not only does the
overlapping appear more technical than real but, in fact, may be almost
nonexistent, depending upon the ultimate court review of the Board's
decisions in this area. Thus, one commentator takes the position that
whatever position a court might have adopted concerning an extension
of Miranda to racial discrimination cases prior to the enactment of
Title VII, it is now proper to consider Title VII in construing the
application of the NLRA in this area."6
Arnold Ordman, the General Counsel of the NLRB, in a July 1965
address to investigators affiliated with the Civil Rights Commission,
discussed the possible overlapping of lines of jurisdiction between the
Board and the Commission, and pointed out that although courts
have not finally ruled upon the Board's position with respect to race
issues, such decisions will be forthcoming in the next year or two.
VII. CONCLUSION
A review of federal legislation during the past three decades high-
lights the progress made in the general elimination of discriminatory
116 Sherman, supra note 94, at 818, n.184.
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practices. This evolution of the sustained attack on discriminatory prac-
tices has been accomplished through the mutual cooperation and
efforts of civic minded organizations, communities and individuals,
and has been implemented and enforced by the three branches of state
and federal government as well as numerous administrative agencies,
all of whom coordinated their activities to reach the desired results.
Thus, it is clear that the Board and the new Commission, both
charged with the duty of enforcing public service statutes, will, in the
event of any overlapping, readily reach mutual accommodation in the
interest of effectuating the purposes of both acts. This is amply dem-
onstrated by the Board's practice of reaching an accommodation where
concurrent jurisdiction with other forums is involved.'" It may well
be that both organizations will proceed on a complaint arising out of
the same set of facts, but with different approaches and different
remedies combine to produce an even more effective result. If, in fact,
an overlap of jurisdiction arises at all, it would appear that it would
be de minimis; and, if it does occur, it may well prove desirable, since
it will provide dual protection for the individual discriminated against,
affording him an opportunity to choose his own forum and the election
of remedies.
117
 Modern Express, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964); The Elintkote Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Kentile, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 981 (1964); International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B.
1416 (1961); Continental Baking Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 937 (1960); Clyde Taylor Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
600
